Quantum key distribution (QKD) systems can send signals over more than 100 km standard optical fiber and are widely believed to be secure. Here, we show experimentally for the first time a technologically feasible attack, namely the time-shift attack, against a commercial QKD system. Our result shows that, contrary to popular belief, an eavesdropper, Eve, has a non-negligible probability (∼4%) to break the security of the system. Eve's success is due to the well-known detection efficiency loophole in the experimental testing of Bell inequalities. Therefore, the detection efficiency loophole plays a key role not only in fundamental physics, but also in technological applications such as QKD.
Recently, there has been a lot of theoretical interest on the connection between the security of QKD and fundamental physical principles such as the violation of Bell's inequality and the no-signaling constraint [10] on spacelike observables. An ultimate goal, which has not yet been achieved [11] , is to construct a device-independent security proof. As is well-known, the experimental testing of Bell's inequality often suffers from the detection efficiency loophole. A fair sampling assumption may save the day. However, as we will demonstrate below, rather surprisingly, the low detection efficiency of practical detectors not only violates the fair sampling assumption that would be needed in security proofs based on Bellinequality violation, but also gives Eve (an eavesdropper) a powerful handle to break the security of a practical QKD system. Therefore, the detection efficiency loophole is of both conceptual and practical interest.
Our work is an illustration of general physical limitations, rather than a particular technological weakness. Indeed, a practical QKD system often includes two or more detectors. It is virtually impossible to manufacture identical detectors in practice. As a result, the two detectors of the same QKD system will exhibit different detection efficiencies as functions of either one or a combination of variables in the time, frequency, polarization, and/or spatial domains. If Eve manipulates a signal in these variables, she could effectively exploit the detection efficiency loophole to break the security of a QKD system. In our experiment, we consider Eve's manipulation of the time variable. Our work demonstrates the general problem of detection efficiency loophole in practical QKD systems.
Recently, quantum hacking has attracted much scientific and popular attention [12] . Makarov et al. proposed a faked-state attack and studied its feasibility with their home-made QKD system [13, 14] . Unfortunately, this attack is an intercept-resend attack which is hard to implement in practice. Therefore, this attack has never been successfully demonstrated in experiments. Kim et al. simulated an entanglement probe attack on the BB84 protocol [15] . However, it serves to demonstrate the security rather than the insecurity of QKD systems because this attack has already been considered in standard security proofs. A study of the information leakage due to public announcement of the timing information by Bob was reported [16] . However, Bob does not need to make such an announcement in practice. In summary, despite numerous efforts, up till now, no one has even come close to hacking successfully a practical QKD system, let alone a commercial one.
Here, we present the first experimental demonstration of a successful hacking against a commercial QKD system. It is highly surprising to break a well-designed commercial QKD system with only current technology. Our work shows clearly the slippery nature of QKD [17] and forces us to re-examine the security of practical QKD systems and its applications in real-life. The attack we use is the time-shift attack proposed by us in [18] . The time-shift attack is simple to implement as it does not involve any measurement or state preparation by Eve.
The time-shift attack exploits the detection efficiency mismatch between the two detectors in a QKD system in the time domain. In QKD security proofs (e.g. ref. [5] ), a standard assumption is that the detection efficiencies (a)Conceptual efficiency mismatch. for the bits "0" and "1" are equal. However, its validity is questionable [13, 14, 18] . For example, a typical timedependence of the detection efficiency of a practical fiberbased QKD system (with InGaAs avalanche photo diodes (APDs) of telecom wavelength operating at gated Geiger mode) is illustrated in Fig. 1(a) . Note that, at time A the detection efficiency for the bit "0" is much higher than that for the bit "1", while the opposite case can be found at B. The detection efficiency mismatch can only be confidently removed if the efficiencies are constant in time domain. We remark that even non-gated single-photon detectors such as Si APDs exhibit detection efficiency mismatch due to intrinsic dead-time [19] .
The idea of the time-shift attack is simple. Eve can shift the arrival time of each signal to either A or B randomly with probabilities p A and p B = 1 − p A respectively. Eve can carefully choose p A to keep the number of Bob's detection events of "0"s and "1"s equal. Since Bob's measurement result will be biased towards "0" or "1" depending on the time shift (A or B), Eve can "steal" information without alerting Alice or Bob. A conceptual setup to launch the time-shift attack is shown in Fig.  1(b) . Eve can choose to connect Alice and Bob through either a longer arm or a shorter arm so as to shift the signal around time A (a negative shift), or around time B (a positive shift).
The success of our demonstration is a big surprise because in our experiment, Eve cannot perform a quantum non-demolition (QND) measurement on the photon number or compensate any loss introduced by the attack, while Eve can have arbitrarily advanced technology in security proofs. In other words, our practical Eve is much weaker than the eavesdropper in security proofs. It is surprising to see an attack which can be implemented with current technology (e.g., the time-shift attack) can do better than even the QND attack, which is significantly beyond current technology.
The experiment is performed on top of a modified commercial ID-500 QKD setup [20] manufactured by id Quantique. The schematic of our experimental setup is shown in Fig. 2 .
The crucial issues in the experiment are the activation times of the two detectors (APDs in Fig. 2 ). The commercial QKD system has a built-in calibration program which sets the activation time of each detector independently. The activation times of the two detectors differ slightly due to the discrepancies in the lengths of the fibers connecting them. Ideally, to minimize the detection efficiency mismatch, the difference of the activation times should take a constant value. However, at times the difference in the activation times as set by the built-in calibration program deviates from this value, suggesting a larger efficiency mismatch. We observed the maximum value of the deviations as ∆ ∼ 100ps. To get statistics of this deviation, we ran the built-in calibration program for 2844 times, during which the deviation reaches ∆ for 106 times. This is, the detection efficiency mismatch reaches its maximum value with a probability of ∼4%.
After the calibration of the activation times, we use the optical variable delay line (OVDL in Fig. 2 ) to manually shift the arrival time of the signals, looking for instants that show large efficiency mismatch.
There are several challenges in this experiment. In our setup, the gating window for the detectors (APDs in Fig.  2 ) is ∼500ps, which is close to the laser pulse width. This will "blur" the efficiency mismatch. However, the commercial QKD system is not immune from the time-shift attack as Eve can simply apply standard pulse compression technique to the bright pulses sent from Bob to Alice in the channel (e.g. [21] ). In our experiment, we replaced the original laser source by a PicoQuant laser diode (LD in Fig. 2 ) with pulse width ∼100ps, which is equivalent to the compression scheme mentioned above [22] .
Another challenge is the chromatic dispersion in the fiber which broadens the laser pulses. We thus installed ∼ 2 km dispersion compensating fiber (DCF in Fig. 2) . Ideally, Eve can pre-chirp the bright pulses that are sent from Bob to Alice. Note that both the pre-chirping and pulse compression can be done on the bright pulses from Bob to Alice without touching the quantum signal sent from Alice to Bob. Therefore, neither process would increase the channel loss when Alice sends quantum signals to Bob. We thus view the dispersion compensating fiber (DCF in Fig. 2) as part of Alice's local apparatus.
A third challenge is the optimization of the attack. Naïvely, Eve could simply select large shifts as they would definitely provide substantial intrinsic detection efficiency mismatches. However, they may be suboptimal 
). The peak efficiencies of detectors are slightly different, suggesting the detection efficiency has slightly drifted since the factory setting. The data size for time shifts with large detection efficiency mismatch (-250ps, -200ps, 500ps, 600ps, and 650ps) is chosen to be 20.97Mbit to acquire accurate mismatch, while the data size for other shifts is chosen to be 1.05Mbit to speed up the experiment.
for the attack because their low intrinsic detection efficiencies make the dark count significant, increasing the quantum bit error rate (QBER) and consequently the cost of the error correction. Therefore the task of choosing the shifts is non-trivial. The time-shift attack will introduce additional loss as the signals are shifted to the low-efficiency region. Nonetheless, since Alice and Bob's channel may not be a straight line and there may be additional loss due to components such as optical switches, in practice Eve could lower the channel loss by for example replacing existing channel with a better one without alerting Alice and Bob. So, the power of time-shift attack may be stronger than what one naïvely thinks.
We demonstrated the time-shift attack in the following way: first, the activation times of detectors were determined by the built-in program; second, the arrival times of the signals were shifted at a step of 50 ps (a narrower step was not necessary as the pulse width was ∼100 ps); third, at each shifted time, Alice and Bob exchanged key at an average photon number (at Alice's output) of 0.1; fourth, Bob calculated the counts of each detector and the error rates. The entire experiment after each calibration spanned ∼15 minutes.
In real attack Eve should apply an alternative technique to obtain the efficiency mismatch as she has no access to Bob's apparatus [18] : she can gradually shift a small subset of the signals and set them to 0 or 1 and deduce the amount of the mismatch from Bob's detection announcement. Our experimental results show that the mismatch is stable throughout the 15-min span of our experiment. Therefore Eve has sufficient time to obtain the mismatch information and launch her attack.
The experimentally measured detector efficiencies are shown in Fig. 3 for the case where the deviation in activation times takes the maximal value ∆t m . It shows substantial detection efficiency mismatch. In particular, two shifts with large mismatches are found as in Table I .
The security of the QKD system is analyzed in the following way: one can estimate an upper bound K U of the key length given the efficiency mismatch known by Eve and a lower bound K L ignoring the time-shift attack (as Alice and Bob cannot detect the attack). If the upper bound is less than the lower bound (i.e., K L > K U ), there must be some information leaked to Eve unknown to Alice or Bob.
We consider that Alice sends N bits to Bob, among which the same basis are used forÑ bits and Bob detectsÑ Q signals (Q is the overall gain). Here we assume that infinite decoy state protocol and one-way classical communications for post-processing are used.
Lower bound : The error correction will consume
bits, where E is the overall QBER, H 2 (x) is the standard binary Shannon entropy function, f (x) is the error correction inefficiency [23] . The net key length ignoring the time-shift attack is thus [5, 24, 25, 26 ]
where Q i and e i are the gain and the QBER for the signals with i photons sent by Alice.
Upper bound : an upper bound is given by [27] 
where X, Z 1 , and Z 2 are classical random variables representing Alice's initial bit, Eve's choice of the time shift for each bit, and the basis information, respectively. The upper bound and the lower bound of the key rate can then be calculated from Eqs. (1)-(3) using data in Table I. The calculation results are shown in Table I (c). Y 0 is determined experimentally. Note that no double clicks were observed in our experiment.The fact that K L > K U clearly indicates the success of the attack [28] .
We conclude with a few general lessons. First, countermeasures often exist for known attacks. For instance, the "four-state measurement" proposal (which suggests that for phase-encoding BB84 protocol, Bob's phase modulation is randomly selected from a set of four values instead of two values) can shield the time-shift attack. Second, the implementation of a counter-measure may open up new security loopholes. For instance, the four-state measurement scheme will be vulnerable to combined large pulse [29] and time-shift attack. Once an attack is known, the prevention is usually easy. However, we have a third lesson: unanticipated attacks are most dangerous.
The time-shift attack is demonstrated on a bidirectional system. However, it is a threat to a general class of QKD systems (including uni-directional setup) and protocols (eg. [2] ). Moreover, we are concerned with the general physical limitations of detection efficiency loophole, rather than a specific technological problem. The time-shift attack can be easily generalized to spatial-, spectral-, and polarization-shift attack exploiting the efficiency mismatch in the corresponding domains. On the practical side, our work highlights the significance of side channel attacks [30, 31] in QKD. Historically, the existence of a side-channel attack went back to the first QKD experiment, which was unconditionally secure to any eavesdropper who happens to be deaf! In summary, we report the first experimental demonstration of a technologically feasible attack against a commercial QKD system. Our results clearly show that even QKD systems built by trustworthy manufacturers may contain subtle flaws that will allow Eve to break it with current technologies. The success of the attack highlights the importance to battle-test practical QKD systems and work on security proofs with testable assumptions. It is remarkable that the detection efficiency loophole plays a key role in both fundamental physics and technological applications (e.g., QKD systems) [31] . How to close the detection efficiency loophole and side-channel attacks will be an important subject for future investigation.
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